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ABSTRACT
Infertility is a social onus for women in Iran, who are expected 
to produce children early within marriage. With its estimated 1.5 
million infertile couples, Iran is the only Muslim country in which 
assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) using donor gametes and 
embryos have been legitimized by religious authorities and passed 
into law. Th is has placed Iran, a Shia-dominant country, in a unique 
position vis-à-vis the Sunni Islamic world, where all forms of gamete 
donation are strictly prohibited. In this article, we fi rst examine the 
“Iranian ART revolution” that has allowed donor technologies to 
be admitted as a form of assisted reproduction. Th en we examine 
the response of Iranian women to their infertility and the profound 
social pressures they face. We argue that the experience of infertility 
and its treatment are mediated by women’s socioeconomic position 
within Iranian society. Many women lack economic access to in vitro 
fertilization (IVF) technologies and fear the moral consequences of 
gamete donation. Th us, the benefi ts of the Iranian ART revolution are 
mixed: although many Iranian women have been able to overcome 
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their infertility through ARTs, not all women’s lives are improved by 
these technologies.
Th e Iranian civil law emphasizes that family is a warm and placid 
institute founded upon the authority of the husband and the father. 
Motherhood and doing housework are the woman’s responsibility, 
and outside work is the man’s; and the man is the breadwinner. Such 
policies reinforce the traditional patriarchal relations within the family. 
(Sarokhani and Raf ’atjah 2004)
INTRODUCTION
Infertility, defined as the inability to achieve a viable pregnancy after 12 months of regular unprotected sexual intercourse, affects more than 15 
percent of all couples around the world at some point in their reproduc-
tive lives (Vayena, Rowe, and Griffin 2002). Factors causing high rates of 
infertility in parts of the non-Western world, including the Middle East, 
are varied, but tubal infertility due to reproductive tract infections is wide-
ly regarded as the primary form of preventable infertility among women 
(Sciarra 1994; Inhorn 2003a). Although rarely socially acknowledged, 
male infertility contributes to at least half of all cases worldwide and is 
often the most difficult form of infertility to treat (Devroey et al. 1998; Ir-
vine 1998; Kamischke and Nieschlag 1998). Yet, infertility is paradoxically 
considered to be a “woman’s problem” around the world, and thus the 
role of male infertility is vastly underestimated and even hidden in many 
societies, including those of the Middle East (Inhorn 2002; 2003a; 2003b; 
2003c; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2007).
Th roughout most of the world, infertility is a grave form of re-
productive morbidity with profoundly gendered social consequences 
(Inhorn and van Balen 2002), consequences that are usually suff ered by 
women more than men, and especially by women living in pronatalist, 
patriarchal social settings. For example, Inhorn’s ethnographic trilogy 
on infertility, patriarchy, and the “quest for conception”—including re-
sort to in vitro fertilization (IVF)—in Egypt documents the tremendous 
social suff ering experienced by infertile Egyptian women in a pronatalist 
or “child desiring” society (Inhorn 1994; 1996; 2003b). Other scholars 
have documented the gendered burden of infertility in many parts of the 
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Muslim world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Boerma and Mgalla 
2001; Inhorn and van Balen 2002).
Th e Islamic Republic of Iran is no exception. Iran has experienced 
rapid growth over the past 30 years, leading to a total population of 
about 70 million (Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, and Chavoshi 2003). Al-
though an award-winning population control program has brought the 
population growth rate down from 3.9 percent during the 1976–1986 
decade to around 1.5 percent during the 1996–2006 decade (one of the 
sharpest fertility declines ever recorded), Iran remains socially prona-
talist (Inhorn 2006c). Having children remains a fundamental drive for 
many couples aft er marriage. Both religious and cultural norms and 
values reinforce such perceptions, as noted in the introductory quote 
by Sarokhani and Raf ’atjah (2004). Iranian culture generally considers 
children “divine gift s,” and producing such children is the fundamental 
reason for marriage among many couples. Having children is generally 
regarded as strengthening the institution of the family and as a sign of 
commitment to Iranian cultural values.
Given this pronatalism, it is not surprising that infertility clinics 
are present in most provinces of Iran, attempting to help infertile cou-
ples to conceive. Iran currently boasts about 50 IVF clinics, one of the 
highest numbers of clinics in the Middle East and similar to Egypt in 
this regard (Inhorn 2003b). Although the majority of Iranian IVF clinics 
are located in Tehran, which is generally believed to have better medical 
facilities with more experienced physicians, there are, nevertheless, IVF 
clinics in such provincial cities as Yazd, which is noted for its conser-
vatism. Given the status of Iran as an Islamic republic, it may come as a 
surprise that Iran is the only Muslim country in which IVF using donor 
gametes, embryos,1 and surrogates has been legitimized by religious 
authorities and passed into law. Th is has placed Iran, a Shia-dominant 
country, in a unique position vis-à-vis the Sunni Islamic world, where all 
forms of third-party donation are strictly prohibited by religious decrees 
and codes of medical ethics.
In this article, we fi rst examine what we call the “Iranian ART 
revolution” that has allowed donor technologies to be admitted as a 
form of assisted conception. Th en we examine the response of Iranian 
women to their infertility and the profound social pressures they face. 
We argue that infertility provokes a social crisis for women in Iran and 
4  JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EAST WOMEN’S STUDIES 4:2
that, despite the array of modern infertility treatments, including as-
sisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), now available in the country, 
not all infertile women utilize these options. As we argue, many Iranian 
women lack economic access to these technologies and fear the moral 
consequences of ARTs, particularly third-party donation. However, for 
those women who are able to access ARTs in Iranian IVF clinics, the 
technologies have helped them to recast infertility as a medically reme-
diable condition, with donor technologies conceived of as just one more 
medical solution, albeit a secret one, to overcome their suff ering.
THE UNIQUE CASE OF IRAN: INFERTILITY, IVF, 
AND GAMETE DONATION
Despite the large population of infertile Iranians—estimated at 10–15 
percent of all married couples, or approximately 1.5 million couples—
little is known about how infertility is perceived by Iranian women 
themselves. A few psychological surveys carried out in Iran have shown 
that infertile women are aff ected by worries of losing the support of their 
husbands and families, and that the fundamental source of this anxiety 
derives from interference by others (e.g., mothers-in-law) in the life of 
the childless couple (Mahmoodi 1994; Kormi-Noori 2000; Haji-Kazemi 
2001; Goodarzi and Badakhsh 2002).
Given such circumstances, it is not surprising that many infertile 
Iranian couples may do whatever it takes to save their relationship, 
even if it means undertaking risky or onerously expensive infertility 
treatments (cf. Daniluk, Leader, and Taylor 1987; Molock 2000; Inhorn 
2003a; 2003b). In this regard, Iranians have a wide array of treatment 
options available to them, especially compared to the Sunni Muslim 
countries of the Middle East. To wit, in the Sunni Muslim world, a ban 
on third-party donation is eff ectively in place, such that ova, sperm, 
embryo, and uterus donation (as in surrogacy) are all strictly prohibited 
(Serour 1996; Meirow and Schenker 1997; Eich 2002; 2005; 2006; Moosa 
2003; Inhorn 2003b; 2006a). Diverging from this course, the Supreme 
Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Hoseyni Khamenei, 
issued a fatwa in the late 1990s eff ectively permitting donor technolo-
gies, both egg and sperm donation, to be used. Th us, unlike all other 
Muslim countries (with the exception of Lebanon, which is following 
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the Iranian lead) (Clarke 2006; Inhorn 2006a), third-party gamete dona-
tion is currently available in Iran, having been approved by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly in 2002.
However, the situation for Shia Muslims in Iran (and elsewhere) 
is actually much more complicated than this. Shia religious authorities 
give considerable precedence to a form of individual religious reason-
ing known as ijtihad, through the use of ‘aql, or intellectual reasoning. 
Although there is a strong tradition of ijtihad in Sunni Islam, Sunni 
Muslim clerics tend to favor scriptural sources over individual moral 
reasoning. Shia, on the other hand, pride themselves on the greater 
freedom of their religious authorities to exercise ijtihad (Clarke 2006; 
2007). As many scholars of Shia have noted (Cole 2002; Tremayne 2005; 
2006a; 2006b; 2008), the practice of ijtihad has allowed a certain fl exibil-
ity and pragmatism toward new technological developments, including 
IVF and a number of other new medical technologies (e.g., contracep-
tion, organ transplants, transgender surgery). Furthermore, ijtihad has 
ultimately led to great heterogeneity of opinion and practice within the 
Shia community.
Additionally, Shia Islam allows a form of temporary marriage 
called mut‘a (also called sigheh in Iran), which is not recognized by 
Sunni religious authorities (Zuhur 1992). In Shia Islam, mut‘a is a union 
between an unmarried Muslim woman and a married or unmarried 
Muslim man, which is contracted for a fi xed time period in return for 
a set amount of money. It is practiced in Iran (Haeri 1989), as well as in 
other parts of the Shia world. In the past, middle-aged and older women 
who were divorced or widowed (many following the loss of men during 
the devastating eight-year Iran-Iraq war) oft en engaged in mut‘a mar-
riages for fi nancial support. For Shia men, mut‘a marriages could be 
contracted while traveling, or as a means of achieving marital variety 
and sexual pleasure (Haeri 1989).
Within this context of ijtihad and mut‘a, divergent opinions on 
gamete donation are beginning to emerge in the Shia Muslim world. 
Various Shia ulema have come to their own conclusions regarding the 
acceptability of gamete donation, with or without mut‘a. Some Shia 
clerics, siding with the Sunni majority, continue to prohibit gamete 
donation for their followers, while others have allowed it under certain 
conditions. Some, but not all, Shia clerics have invoked mut‘a to make 
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egg donation legal within the parameters of marriage; they argue that 
the husband should contract a mut‘a marriage with the egg donor for 
the period of time in which the whole procedure (from egg retrieval to 
embryo transfer) takes place. Because polygyny is legal in Islam, mut‘a
marriage avoids the implications of zina, or adultery, which would occur 
if the husband did not marry the egg donor (Inhorn 2006c).
Th ese disagreements of opinion have played out in interesting ways. 
As shown in anthropologist Morgan Clarke’s recent research on the Shia 
religious discourses surrounding gamete donation, Ayatollah Khamenei 
clearly stipulates in his fatwa on gamete donation that mut‘a marriage 
is not required, for he believes that zina (adultery) requires the physical 
act of intercourse. Yet, many Shia jurists do not agree with Khamenei’s 
position, nor his permissive fatwa on donor technologies. For example, 
Shaikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Lebanon’s most prominent 
Shia religious authority, does not agree with Ayatollah Khamenei’s permis-
sion of sperm donation, because, according to Shaikh Fadlallah, a married 
woman should not accept sperm from another man2 (Clarke 2006; 2007; 
2008). Furthermore, because a married Shia Muslim woman cannot marry 
another man other than her husband (since polyandry is illegal in Islam), 
she cannot contract a mut‘a marriage with a sperm donor to make the 
donation legal. Th e child born of a sperm donor would be a laqit, or out-of-
wedlock child, without a family name and without a father. Th us, in theory, 
only widowed or otherwise single women should be able to accept donor 
sperm, in order to avoid the implications of zina, or adultery. However, in 
Muslim countries, single motherhood of a donor child is unlikely to be 
socially acceptable (Zuhur 1992; Inhorn 1996; 2006c).
Interestingly, in March 2006, a two-day international conference 
was held in Tehran on “Gamete and Embryo Donation,” sponsored by 
the Avesina Research Institute in association with the Law and Political 
Science Faculty of the University of Tehran. Th e conference provided a 
fascinating example of “ijtihad in action” (Inhorn 2006c), or the kind 
of rigorous debate that is the norm in Shia jurisprudence. Some Iranian 
clergy and physicians present at the conference advocated for future laws 
permitting all forms of donation as well as surrogacy. Once passed into 
law, gamete donation of all kinds would be diffi  cult to stop (Tremayne 
2008). However, other Shia clergy at the conference did not agree with 
this “permissiveness,” arguing against both embryo and gamete dona-
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tion. For example, a Shia sharia judge from Bahrain took great pains to 
describe his opposition to all forms of gamete donation. According to 
him, Iranian clergy, who speak Persian rather than Arabic, are not as 
familiar with the original Islamic scriptures (in Arabic) that serve to 
demonstrate the immorality of third-party donation. Th us, in his view, 
some Iranian clergy are “innovating” in ways that are religiously unac-
ceptable, and which are at odds with the rest of the Muslim world.
It is important to note that Ayatollahs Ali al-Sistani and Muham-
mad Sa‘id al-Tabataba’i al-Hakim, both Shia religious authorities in 
Iraq, advise caution against third-party donation practices, viewing 
them as largely unacceptable (Clarke 2006; 2008). Indeed, Ayatollah 
al-Sistani’s son, Muhammad Rida al-Sistani, has devoted an entire vol-
ume of richly documented legal analysis to this debate, providing “an 
invaluable resource for other scholars” (Clarke 2006, 26). According to 
Clarke, “Sistani’s work, while perhaps posing more questions than clear 
answers, opens up for other scholars a fascinating window into this area 
of Shi’ite jurisprudential debate, at a time when the Western media are 
just waking up to the vibrant engagement Shi’ite scholars have had with 
other such new technologies” (26).
Given these moral controversies, especially surrounding sperm 
donation, it is important to note that a recent law on embryo donation 
has been passed in Iran (Tremayne 2008), making it the only Middle 
Eastern Muslim country to enact such legislation. Th e law was passed 
in 2003 in the Iranian Parliament and was approved by the Guardian 
Council, a religious “watch-dog” body that must endorse a bill before it 
becomes law. Even though the law is brief (less than one page), it states 
clearly and succinctly who can and cannot donate and receive gametes 
and embryos. Egg donation is allowed, as long as the husband mar-
ries the egg donor temporarily, thereby ensuring that all three parties 
are married. Sperm donation, on the other hand, is legally forbidden, 
because a sperm donor cannot temporarily marry an already married 
woman whose husband is infertile. However, quite interestingly, embryo 
donation—which involves both sperm and egg from another couple—is
allowed in order to overcome both male and female infertility. Be-
cause an embryo comes from a married couple and is given to another 
married couple, it is considered hallal, or religiously permissible.
Th e social and biological implications of embryo donation are quite 
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interesting. For Iranian couples unable to produce a child because of 
male infertility, embryo donation allows them to bypass the problem of 
the husband’s weak (or absent) sperm. However, embryo donation does 
not allow a presumably fertile wife of an infertile husband to contribute 
her own ova, in eff ect severing her biological ties to the donor child. 
Furthermore, and most strikingly, embryos donated from another mar-
ried couple involve both egg and sperm donation. Even though direct 
sperm donation is bypassed, embryo donation still disrupts male pa-
ternity and involves the acceptance by an already married woman of 
another man’s sperm (and woman’s eggs). Whether the social ramifi ca-
tions of embryo donation have been carefully thought through by the re-
ligious and legal authorities in Iran remains unclear (Tremayne 2008).
Meanwhile, in the absence of eff ective enforcement of this new law, 
some IVF physicians in Iran—as well as in Shia-dominant Lebanon, 
which is closely following the Iranian lead—are capitalizing on the 
relaxed regulatory environment and the original “permissive” fatwa of 
Ayatollah Khamenei to practice all forms of gamete donation among 
their desperate infertile patients. As noted by Clarke (2006, 26), “Doc-
tors keep Khamenei’s fatwa collection on the shelves of their surgeries to 
demonstrate the permissibility of such procedures to skeptical Muslim 
patients; and many such patients have profi ted from it to undertake 
donor sperm and egg procedures, even surrogacy arrangements, with a 
clear conscience.” Similarly, as noted by Soraya Tremayne,
In reality the lack of clarity in religious rulings has left  a wide gap in 
the ethical, moral, and legal aspects of the practice of ARTs. Th e over-
all protection that such approvals provide, inadvertently has created a 
confusing situation for medical practitioners, who, in their everyday 
practices face complex situations which are not covered by religious 
rules…. But as these gaps emerge, and the medical practitioners, coop-
erating closely with the “liberal” religious rules, try to close them, the 
balance of power has gradually shift ed in favor of biomedical knowl-
edge as the determining and authoritative source of wisdom as far as 
ARTs are concerned. (personal communication, July 2004)
As a result of these legal-moral-medical ambiguities, sperm dona-
tion is, in fact, practiced in some clinics in Iran, without clear legal con-
sequences for either couples or physicians (Garmaroudi n.d.; Tremayne 
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2008). To alleviate moral concerns, some women divorce their infertile 
husbands before undertaking sperm donation, then remarry them aft er 
a three-and-a-half month waiting period (i.e., iddah, the period required 
to establish the pregnancy) (Tremayne 2008). With all forms of sperm, 
egg, and embryo donation, the donor child inherits from the infertile 
parents.3 Furthermore, the donor couple should be married, legally 
and religiously, and should undergo medical testing for physical and 
mental health, IQ tests for normal intelligence, and screening for drug 
and alcohol addiction. Donors who receive payment for their gametes 
generally remain anonymous to the recipients. However, as shown by 
both Tremayne (2005; 2008) and Garmaroudi (n.d.), donation between 
kin, especially sisters, remains common and is even preferred by many 
couples in Iran. Th e same may be true of surrogacy. Garmaroudi (n.d.) 
found that gestational surrogacy as a solution to infertility is becoming 
increasingly popular in Iran, and among the majority of Shia legal au-
thorities, it is an acceptable form of assisted reproduction.
Despite the availability and legality of this panoply of assisted re-
productive techniques, the question remains: Do most infertile Iranian 
women actually resort to these morally controversial technologies? Based 
on research from other developing countries, the most probable answer 
would be “No.” Due to the prohibitive costs, as well as a variety of social, 
religious, legal, and medical barriers, ARTs of all types remain out of 
reach for most non-Western women, as well as minority women within 
Western societies (van Balen and Inhorn 2002). Inhorn (2003b, 16) has 
called these multiple barriers “arenas of constraint,” or the “various 
structural, social-cultural, ideological, and practical obstacles and ap-
prehensions” that accompany the global spread of ARTs. She has outlined 
eight such arenas of constraint faced by infertile Egyptians (2003b), as 
well as by poor Arab Americans living in metropolitan Detroit, Michigan 
(Inhorn and Fakih 2006). In the remainder of this paper, we ask whether 
infertile Iranian women face such constraints and, if so, whether their 
concerns revolve around the moral implications of gamete donation.
ETHNOGRAPHIC SETTING, METHODS, 
AND STUDY POPULATION
A qualitative ethnographic study was conducted in metropolitan Tehran 
to assess the experiences of infertile women in the midst of Iran’s ART 
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revolution. As with Inhorn’s original study of infertility in Egypt (1994; 
1996), the decision was made to focus on women alone, given the gen-
der of the primary interviewer (Razeghi-Nasrabad) and the perceived 
sensitivity of male infertility and husbands’ reactions to the study. Th e 
target population was thus defi ned as all infertile women aged 20 years 
or older who had been married for more than two years and who had 
been unable to conceive a child because of a female infertility problem. 
To gain familiarity with the issues at hand and possible problems of 
engaging in ethnographic fi eldwork on this sensitive subject, twelve 
infertile women were identifi ed through purposive sampling for a pilot 
study consisting of in-depth interviews. Of the twelve women contacted 
in the fi rst stage, we conducted in-depth interviews with only six. One 
woman changed her mind about participating despite her initial willing-
ness; three agreed to participate only by mobile phone interviews, due to 
fear of their husbands’ reactions; and another two were infertile follow-
ing previous births of living children. Th us, the need for a clinic-based 
study, which would cover a broad socioeconomic spectrum of infertile 
women, became evident.
To that end, we recruited participants through the Avesina Infertil-
ity Treatment Clinic, one of the leading private IVF centers in northern 
Tehran, as well as fi ve government-funded Health and Treatment Cen-
ters (HTCs)4 catering to the reproductive health needs of poor women 
in eastern and northern metropolitan Tehran.5 If we had restricted our 
recruitment to the IVF clinic alone, we would have missed many poor 
infertile women, including those who were unable to pay for IVF treat-
ment, as well as those whose husbands had already remarried. Nonethe-
less, it is important to note that HTCs generally do not provide adequate 
diagnostic and treatment services for infertility. Th eir major goal is to 
serve married women, aged 15–49, who are eligible for family planning, 
or mothers with children under the age of two who require maternal 
and child healthcare. Infertile women rarely visit these centers, and 
HTCs do not maintain separate records on these women.
Having said that, in the annual audit of these centers, all women 
aged 15–49 under the coverage of HTCs are asked questions about 
their households, family planning, and use of contraception. Th rough 
these annual audits, we were able to identify possible infertile women 
and invite them, via health communicators,6 to participate in the study. 
ABBASI-SHAVAZI, INHORN, RAZEGHI-NASRABAD, TOLOO  11
Th rough the fi ve HTCs, we invited 52 women who appeared to be infer-
tile to participate. In ten cases, the husband was infertile, not the wife. 
Twenty-seven other women declined to participate or did not meet all 
the selection criteria (i.e., women who were married for more than two 
years, were not using any type of contraception, and were childless 
at the time of the study). Eventually, 15 women who were themselves 
infertile and living without children were interviewed from the health 
centers.
Another 15 women were identifi ed and interviewed as they at-
tended the Avesina IVF clinic, thus bringing the total sample size to 30. 
It is important to note that the interview schedule used in this study, 
as well as the research proposal, were both approved in advance by the 
Medical Ethics Committee of the Avesina Clinic. Th is clinic is part of 
a larger research institute where many reproductive health projects are 
managed (and a journal, Reproduction and Infertility, is published). 
Th us, an Ethics Committee is charged with reviewing and approving 
all projects before they are undertaken, similar to Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) for research projects in Western countries.
Before interviews were conducted, all women in the study were 
briefed about the topic of the research, the privacy of their information, 
and the freedom to withdraw at any time. Th ey were reassured that 
no personal information would be used, all the records would remain 
confi dential, and only the researchers would have access to the securely 
stored data. Following women’s verbal consent, interviews took an aver-
age of 45 minutes to complete.
Women at the HTCs ranged in age from 26 to 48. Th eir educational 
status ranged from illiterate to a bachelor’s degree (approximately one-
third with either no or minimal primary schooling, one-third with a 
high school diploma, and one-third with some university education). 
Most spoke Persian, but two spoke Turkish only. Two of the 15 women 
were employed; the rest described themselves as housewives.
Women at the IVF clinic ranged in age from 23 to 49, and, interest-
ingly, their educational backgrounds were almost identical to the HTC 
women in the study. However, one-third of these women were employed. 
Since the women who attended the IVF clinic came from diff erent 
provinces, some of them also spoke other languages and dialects: two 
spoke Turkish, three spoke Gilaki dialect (used in northern Iran near 
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the Caspian Sea), and two spoke Kurdish. Most respondents in both 
groups had been married for over ten years.
ON BEING INFERTILE IN IRAN
Studies from around the world show that women’s welfare and social 
status are usually dependent upon having children, and that infertile 
women oft en live in dire fear of divorce, loss of family support, and 
community stigmatization (Inhorn 1996; Okonofua et al. 1997; Boerma 
and Mgalla 2001; van Balen and Gerrits 2001; Dyer et al. 2002; Inhorn 
and van Balen 2002; Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli 2008). Given this 
reality, it is not surprising that most women in this study burst into tears 
when talking about the impacts of infertility on their lives. A few who 
tried to show calm resolve still described the negative eff ects of infertil-
ity on their marriages and social well-being. Women routinely described 
feelings of depression, anger, anxiety, shame, and isolation as a result of 
their infertile status.
In Iran, children are viewed as important sources of social, psycho-
logical, and economic support for their parents. As discovered in this 
study, having children leads to perceived emotional succor, higher social 
status and prestige, marital security, socioeconomic support, care in old 
age, and fulfi llment of the religious duty to be fruitful and multiply. In 
interviews, women were open about the perceived “value” of children in 
their lives as a great source of emotional, social, and economic support 
over the life course. Every woman in the study was explicit about her 
fears of growing old without children in a society that off ers little in the 
way of a social safety net for women.
For all of the women in this study, the motherhood role was per-
ceived as the very foundation of their social status and identity, and 
children were considered a source of pride and power vis-à-vis the fam-
ily and society at large. In response to the question “Who would you 
want to be?,” most said that their “biggest wish is to become a mother,” 
some stressing that “[they] would give [their] fortune in exchange for 
being able to experience motherhood.” Women in the study explained 
that motherhood is “the most important duty” for a woman and “the 
ideal wife is one who brings children for her husband.” Th ey wanted to 
have children not only to fulfi ll their personal desires, but also because 
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society expects it of them. Without children, they could never achieve 
community acceptance. Indeed, most women believed that not being the 
mother of a child had stigmatized them in their communities.
Yet, many women in the study considered infertility to be beyond 
their control—i.e., their “fate” and “the will of God” (cf. Inhorn 1994). 
Th ey argued that if they were not able to “bring children” into the world, 
this was God’s wish, and they referred to Qur’anic verses to support 
their contention. Accordingly, if God does not will a woman to be fertile, 
no treatment will ever be able to help her. Nonetheless, God also expects 
women to seek solutions to their suff ering; thus, searching for infertility 
treatment is meritorious and is conceived of as part of God’s test of an 
infertile woman’s patience and endurance.
Self-blame was also a recurrent theme in women’s interviews (cf. 
Inhorn 1994; 2003b). For example, women who had used family plan-
ning at the beginning of marriage believed that the contraceptives had 
made them infertile (cf. Inhorn 1994; Okonofua et al. 1997; van Balen 
and Gerrits 2001). According to them, hormonal contraceptives had 
weakened their reproductive potential, and they wished that they had 
followed the advice of relatives who had urged them to abstain from 
contraception in the fi rst years of marriage. Some women regarded the 
infertility as a metaphysical punishment for inappropriate deeds, their 
own or their husband’s. Some of these respondents considered God’s 
will not to give them children as a good sign that their sins were being 
forgiven.
Women not only blame themselves, but are blamed by others for 
the infertility. Iran is one of the many societies where infertility is con-
sidered “a female problem,” and where infertile women, therefore, face 
considerably more familial and social problems than their male partners 
(Mason 1993; Dudgeon and Inhorn 2004; Inhorn 2004). Ale-Ahmad, an 
infertile male Iranian author, writes in his autobiography that despite 
many doctors’ diagnoses that the infertility was not caused by his wife, 
he was infl uenced by his family and considered it “her fault.” Conse-
quently, under familial and social pressure, she underwent unnecessary 
invasive measures, such as operations on her ovaries and fallopian tubes 
(Ale-Ahmad 1981).
In our study, most women stated that before they went to the doc-
tor, all of their family members and they themselves had thought that 
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the infertility was probably “their fault.” A 30-year-old woman from 
Gilan Province, who had been married for ten years, stated:
It’s clear; everybody thinks it’s the woman’s fault. Even myself, as soon 
as I realized I didn’t become pregnant, I was so scared, and before say-
ing anything to my husband I went to a doctor with my mother. But 
the doctor suggested that my husband had to be treated too, and while 
my husband didn’t care much about having a kid, he became angry, 
and we had fi ghts over this for a long time.
Women attending the government HTCs were more likely to ex-
press these kinds of concerns about the social consequences of being 
blamed for the infertility. For example, another participant, whose hus-
band had remarried immediately aft er being informed of her infertility, 
stated that her husband believed from the very beginning that it was 
her fault, and he never agreed to see a doctor. In situations where both 
partners were diagnosed with infertility problems, husbands rarely ac-
cepted this fact. For example, two women invited into the study at HTC 
clinics initially introduced themselves as infertile. But in the course of 
explaining the study and its confi dentiality terms, they soon disclosed 
that their husbands were the infertile ones; both had been threatened 
with divorce if they disclosed the male infertility or refused to shoulder 
the blame.
This was especially true of the mostly poor women attending 
HTCs. Th ese women from the lower socioeconomic rungs of Iranian 
society had usually undergone numerous diffi  culties in their marriages 
as a consequence of infertility and felt very insecure about their futures. 
Because they did not work, they greatly valued children as a form of 
eventual socioeconomic and emotional support and a major factor in 
the survival of their marriages. Indeed, most of them believed that hav-
ing children would be the defi nitive factor in saving their marriages. 
Although they contended that physicians would be able to diagnose the 
cause of their infertility and prescribe the appropriate treatment method 
for them, all of these women had stopped seeking treatment at the time 
of the interview, either because of poverty, lack of treatment success, or 
pressure from others, including husbands and husbands’ families.
“Pressure” from husbands’ families was a recurrent theme of the 
interviews, particularly with women attending HTCs, but also at the 
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IVF clinic. Clearly, infertility negatively aff ects relations with the hus-
band’s family in Iran. While all women considered their own families 
supportive, only two women in the study evaluated their relationships 
with in-laws positively. Th e rest described their in-laws as “cold” and 
“unfriendly.” In a few cases, women’s in-laws had convinced their hus-
bands to divorce or remarry polygynously. In general, women believed 
that being able to have children is a source of power and strength in a 
marriage; thus, infertility is a serious threat to the marital relationship.
Th ere were exceptions to this rule, both at the HTCs and the IVF 
clinic. A few women reported very supportive relationships with their 
husbands, including during the “longue durée” of infertility treatment. 
Th ese couples tended to be more educated and of higher socioeconomic 
status. In a few cases, both partners were infertile or the infertility diag-
nosis was unknown, and the husband’s family accepted this fact. Th ese 
couples described their relationships positively and stated that families 
were generally supportive. Th is helped them to cope with the pressure 
and to keep their lives in order (cf. Inhorn 1996).
Conversely, women whose relationships with husbands and in-laws 
had soured reported many negative changes in their social lives. Because 
they did not like being asked about children, they avoided social settings 
where these questions would arise. Most women stressed that they had 
become less and less social over time—avoiding new social situations 
and staying away from others, including in-laws, to the extent possible. 
Only women who had been married for relatively short periods of time 
were able to “keep their secret” from other people. Generally, women in 
this study who had been infertile for many years described their lives as 
socially isolated and lonely (cf. Inhorn 1996).
It is important to stress that educated, middle-class women in this 
study appeared to be somewhat buff ered from these eff ects, compared 
to lesser-educated, lower-income women. Women whose husbands were 
educated also experienced fewer diffi  culties and were better equipped 
to cope with people’s “inquisitive” and sometimes “insensitive” com-
ments. Not surprisingly, education and the ability to work, if need be, 
made educated infertile women feel more secure than women who were 
entirely reliant on their husbands for support.
All of the women in the study realized that unless they had chil-
dren, they would be faced with four diffi  cult options (Inhorn 2003b): 
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to continue to live together without children; to adopt a child; to 
divorce; or to accept a polygynous marriage. Most of the women in 
this study could not contemplate a life without children, nor could they 
contemplate living life as a divorcée, which would thrust them into an 
extremely vulnerable position. Yet, two women in the study admitted 
that they could not bear the lives they were living, and they knew that 
their marriages would end soon if their treatment was unsuccessful. 
Other women argued that, if only their husbands’ families and relatives 
did not interfere with their lives, they could see continuing to live with 
their husbands without children. Yet, they also feared that over time 
their husbands would be pressured to remarry.
Th e question of adoption is an interesting one. Legal adoption does 
not exist in Islam, although the Islamic scriptures emphasize the kind 
guardianship of orphans and children without parents who can care 
for them (Sonbol 1995; Inhorn 1996; 2006b). Yet, Iran is again unique 
in this regard: in 1975, an adoption law was ratifi ed, giving Iranian 
couples the right to legally adopt orphaned children, including the 
transfer of surname, birth certifi cate, and inheritance rights (Inhorn 
2006b). Th e law has not been modifi ed since that time; thus, infertile 
Iranian couples have the option to adopt as a way of overcoming their 
childlessness. Having said this, the vast majority of women in the study 
absolutely opposed the idea of adoption as a solution to their infertility. 
Th ey described “fear of people’s words,” concerns about the child “being 
illegitimate,” and problems that might arise if “the child’s parents turn 
up and want the child back” (cf. Inhorn 1996 for Egypt; Inhorn 2006b 
for Lebanon). In the end, only two women, one from the IVF clinic 
and one from an HTC clinic, had decided to adopt a child and had sub-
mitted their applications to government welfare organizations.
In the absence of adoption, how do infertile women cope with 
the severe pressures and uncertainties they face? Many women in this 
study found solace in religion, accepting infertility as a “divine test” 
and attempting to convince their husbands of God’s will in the matter. 
Infertile women oft en described becoming more religious, and attending 
religious ceremonies more frequently. Many felt that their spiritual bond 
with God had become stronger—that the experience of withstanding 
infertility had brought them “closer to God.” Th e majority of women 
also believed that God wanted them to strive for a solution to their in-
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fertility and to be patient; if they did so, God would reward them.
THE QUEST FOR CONCEPTION IN IRAN
Islam is a religion that can be said to encourage science, biotechnology, 
and therapeutic agency in the face of illness and adversity. Th us, Mus-
lims are expected to seek solutions to their suff ering, for God is believed 
to have created science and medicine for this purpose (Inhorn 1994; 
2003b). Th e Islamic approach to biomedicine rewards perseverance and 
suggests that pursuing one’s goals will ultimately lead to positive medical 
outcomes (Molock 2000; Inhorn 2003b).
Yet, modern forms of biomedicine are not readily available around 
the world, particularly “high-tech” solutions such IVF for infertility. 
Numerous studies have shown that infertile couples are prominent us-
ers of health services worldwide (van Balen and Gerrits 2001; Sundby 
2002). Yet, modern infertility technologies are not readily available in 
most countries, and when available, they tend to cater to elites who can 
aff ord these services. Because of the numerous constraints on access 
to IVF (Inhorn 2003b), it is not surprising that many infertile couples 
around the world resort to so-called “traditional” methods, oft en mix-
ing biomedical and traditional approaches simultaneously. Th is is true 
even in the West; it is estimated that more than 10 percent of infertile 
Western couples use traditional methods, including herbal medicines, 
spells, and pilgrimages to holy sites (van Balen and Inhorn 2002).
Iranian women are no diff erent in this regard. In this study, women 
expressed their belief that God wanted them to seek a solution to their 
infertility problems. By doing so, they would fulfi ll their divine duty. 
Yet, the quest for conception did not always take a purely biomedical 
form. Many women pursued the traditional forms of therapy available 
in Iran, including herbal medicine, therapeutic prayer, fortune-telling, 
visits to holy places, and saint veneration (cf. Inhorn 1994). More spe-
cifi cally, infertile women in the study reported taking herbal “drugs”; 
undergoing an herbal sauna to induce perspiration and “disinfect” the 
uterus; using herbal douching agents to cleanse the reproductive tract; 
holding religious ceremonies and distributing food for poor children; 
wearing Qur’anic verses and other prayers written on paper or cloth; 
undertaking various measures to “strengthen the back” and prevent 
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miscarriage; and going on ziyarat, or pilgrimages to holy places oft en 
associated with saints.
Fully 60 percent of women in this study who were attending HTCs 
had undertaken such traditional methods in combination with modern 
infertility treatments. (Twenty percent had used only modern methods, 
and 20 percent had used neither.) Interestingly, all but one woman at 
the IVF clinic had used both traditional and modern techniques, even 
if they doubted the effi  cacy of traditional methods.
Why were traditional therapies so popular among Iranian women 
in this study? For one, some poor women in the study were unaware of 
the wide range of biomedical treatment options now available for infer-
tility in Iran, or of how to access them. Th us, they resorted to traditional 
remedies, which are generally readily available in poor communities. But 
the main reason for the popularity of traditional infertility medicine 
in this study was a purely economic one. Namely, traditional remedies 
are generally inexpensive, even free to poor women, while an average 
IVF cycle in Iran ranges in cost from $800 to $4,000, depending upon 
the clinic, the complexity of the infertility case, and the medications 
needed to overcome it. Many women attending the HTCs in this study 
explained that they resorted to traditional methods simply because 
modern infertility treatments such as IVF were well beyond their fi nan-
cial means. Such economic constraints were borne out in the IVF clinic 
sample; namely, half of the women there reported facing severe fi nancial 
problems. In order to pay for their IVF cycles, many had sold property 
and other assets, and some had resorted to taking out a loan to be able 
to pay for the IVF procedure.
Yet, economic obstacles were not the only arena of constraint. Al-
though gamete donation has become widely available in urban Iranian IVF 
centers as noted earlier, moral concerns still appear to weigh heavily on the 
minds of potential users. Fully three-quarters of the mostly poor infertile 
women in the HTC clinics knew about gamete donation, but one-quarter 
of them disagreed with this method for religious reasons, considering it 
haram (prohibited in Islam). Th ey believed that the donation of gametes 
and embryos was against sharia and were not aware, when questioned 
further, that many religious leaders in Iran, including Ayatollah Khamenei, 
had authorized these methods. Of the one-quarter of HTC respondents 
who clearly favored gamete donation, they argued that it represented a 
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positive medical intervention that could save many families and marriages 
(i.e., similar to the justifi cation for the procedure in the initial fatwa of Aya-
tollah Khamenei). One of the women who had undergone an unsuccessful 
form of IVF two years before the interview explained:
Some religious leaders disagree with these methods; but if they under-
stand the condition of us, the infertile, they would certainly agree. We 
don’t do this for sexual pleasure. We too wouldn’t like to use someone 
else’s egg or fetus [sic] if we didn’t have to. But when we realize that 
the life that we have founded with lots of hopes and aspirations is be-
ing destroyed simply by not being able to have a child, we accept to do 
whatever it takes.
Not surprisingly, all of the women attending the IVF clinic 
were familiar with gamete donation, and they were all in favor of this 
method, even if it was not the appropriate solution for their own in-
fertility problems. Among these women, gamete donation was seen as 
just another medical option, no diff erent from any other medical treat-
ment. However, this was a post hoc assessment. Many of these women 
explained that before attending the IVF center, they had considered 
gamete donation to be haram, disallowed by their religion. Th eir ac-
ceptance of gamete donation only came aft er discovering that gamete 
donation was carried out in the clinic under religious guidelines. Most 
interestingly, some of the women in the study had actually switched 
their religious allegiances from “oppositional” to “permissive” clerics, 
once they learned about the possibility of gamete donation and its po-
tential use in their own cases. Others continued to believe that gamete 
donation was a sin, but they decided to try it because of the relational 
diffi  culties they had already faced and the potential positive impacts on 
their lives of bearing a donor child.
In general, there was clearly a growing awareness and acceptance of 
gamete donation as a religiously permissible medical option, especially 
among women attending the IVF clinic in this study. Having said this, 
women in this study who were using gamete donation were doing so in 
secrecy. According to each of these women, nobody—other than their 
doctors and their husbands—was aware of their acceptance of gamete 
donation, and they were constantly worried that somebody else might 
fi nd out. Th ey believed that Iranian society in general does not condone 
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gamete donation, even if most of the religious authorities do. Th us, they 
were concerned that disclosure of this information would severely jeop-
ardize the future of their donor children. In their view, such children 
would be labeled by others as “illegitimate,” creating many social, edu-
cational, career, and marital problems in the future. Th is “technological 
stigma” was most pronounced with the donor technologies; however, 
even “lesser” forms of assisted reproduction, such as IVF without donor 
gametes, were similarly stigmatized (cf. Inhorn 2003b for Egypt). A “cult 
of silence” surrounded these procedures in general, but particularly the 
controversial methods of gamete and embryo donation.7
Although some IVF centers in Iran allow the use of known donors 
(Garmaroudi n.d.; Tremayne 2008), the clinic in this study restricts its 
program to anonymous donors. The center employs a medical social 
worker to match donors and recipients in terms of personal, phenotypical, 
and socioeconomic characteristics. Yet, the two parties remain completely 
unknown to each other, with no rights to future communication. Th is 
decision, although medically and ethically justifi able, leads to additional 
challenges and anxieties for Iranian women whose only solution to their 
infertility is to accept a “mystery gamete.” For their future donor children, 
establishing links to biological parents also remains an impossibility.
In general, women in this study who were using gamete donation 
were unhappy that gamete donation in the clinic was strictly anony-
mous. Th ey were most concerned that the child might look so diff erent 
from its parents that this would lead to future speculation and stigmati-
zation. In such cases, the child might live a life of ostracism and ridicule. 
Most women were also concerned that the donor might not be a person 
of “good social status,” nor a “good Muslim” (or might not be a Muslim 
at all). It was believed that if a donor is a person of “questionable” char-
acter, then these negative personal and moral traits might be passed on 
to the donor child, making the child, in eff ect, an evil being. In addition, 
many women worried about future disclosure to the child. Namely, if 
a child were to learn of his or her donor conception, this could cause 
severe psychological problems, especially if the child began searching 
for an unknown biological parent.
CONCLUSION: AN IRANIAN ART REVOLUTION?
To our knowledge, this study is the fi rst of its kind to explore Iranian 
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women’s experiences of infertility, including the major social impacts of 
infertility on their lives and the dilemmas posed by their use of assisted 
reproductive technologies, especially donor technologies. As argued by 
Inhorn (1996) for Egypt, the infertility experience is a form of “lived 
patriarchy,” in which women are vulnerable to social oppression at the 
multiple levels of marriage, family, and the community. As shown in 
this study, the same holds true in Iran. In-depth interviews with 30 
infertile women demonstrated a wide variety of negative impacts, the 
extent of which depended signifi cantly on the cause of the infertility, 
the duration of the infertile marriage, and a woman’s socioeconomic 
and educational status.
In Iran, children are clearly seen as the bond between a woman 
and her husband. It is generally expected for a newly married couple to 
have their fi rst child immediately aft er marriage or at least within the 
early years. Couples who fail to do so become the target of speculation 
and indirect commentary about the possibility of infertility—usually 
of the woman. At this point, infertile couples face considerable social 
pressure from relatives and friends to “solve the problem.” Indeed, the 
pressure to have children is so intense that even those couples who 
decide to voluntarily postpone pregnancy or to control birth intervals 
may need to reconsider their decision (Abbasi-Shavazi, Asgari-Khang-
hah, and Razeghi-Nasrabad 2005). Suggestions are usually off ered by 
concerned relatives and friends about both traditional and modern 
infertility treatments. If couples refuse to seek treatment or fail to have 
children despite therapeutic intervention, the pressure to conceive may 
lead some couples, even those who love each other, to consider divorce 
or remarriage by the husband. Such eventualities are, in fact, sanctioned 
by Iranian law. According to Article 9 of the Iranian Family Protection 
Law, the spouse of an infertile person can fi le for divorce on the grounds 
of the infertility.
Indeed, such circumstances have been dramatically depicted in 
the film Leila by Iranian director Dariush Mehrjui, which follows 
the demise of an infertile couple’s otherwise happy marriage. But it 
is important to note that Leila was fi lmed in the pre-IVF, pre–gamete 
donation era in Iran. Would the outcome have been diff erent for Leila 
if her story had been told during the midst of Iran’s “ART revolution”? 
Perhaps, given that she was a middle-class woman who could possibly 
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have aff orded IVF and accompanying gamete donation (in her case, 
egg donation). Since the arrival of ARTs, thousands of Iranian women 
have benefi ted from these technologies, including older women in need 
of donor eggs. Indeed, Iran is now the Middle Eastern hub of so-called 
reproductive tourism, as Muslim women from other countries, includ-
ing Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, travel to Tehran in search of donor 
gametes (Shirin Garmaroudi, personal communication, August 2007; 
Inhorn 2006c).
However, for many Iranian women, including the infertile poor, the 
new forms of assisted reproduction now available in Iran do not provide 
easy answers to their infertility. In spite of the veritable revolution in 
ART modalities in Iran—placing the country on the “cutting edge” of 
assisted reproduction in the Muslim world—the benefi ts of this revolu-
tion are not so clear. As we have shown, signifi cant arenas of constraint, 
both moral and material, continue to deter Iranian women from visiting 
IVF clinics and utilizing the panoply of ARTs off ered there. Th e main 
constraint continues to be a class-based, economic one; namely, IVF and 
its variants are prohibitively expensive for many Iranians, just as they 
are for most poor infertile couples around the world (Inhorn 2003b). 
Furthermore, ARTs, especially with third-party donation, do not rest 
neatly within the “local moral worlds” (Kleinman 1992) of all Iranians, 
including infertile ones. Even though many Shia religious authorities 
have sanctioned donor technologies and a law has been passed in Iran 
to support embryo donation, not all infertile couples are willing to uti-
lize donor technologies. Gamete and embryo donation, which are still 
relatively new, are considered sinful by many Iranians, including some 
infertile women who are unfamiliar with the permissive legislation. 
Furthermore, all of the ARTs, including even the most basic form of 
IVF, are accompanied by a “technological” stigma and fears for the fu-
ture of the ART-conceived and especially donor child (Inhorn 2003b). 
Th us, women who undertake ARTs oft en do so in secrecy, maintaining 
a “cult of silence” that operates outside the walls of the clinic (Inhorn 
2003b).
Th ese fi ndings suggest the need for increasing public awareness of 
infertility as a common reproductive health condition in Iran, one that 
aff ects up to 15 percent of all married couples there. In addition, public 
education campaigns to increase awareness of ARTs as religiously and 
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legally legitimate solutions to infertility are advisable. Th rough health 
education, aggressive media campaigns, and the advocacy work of the 
Iranian reproductive health community, negative public attitudes and 
stereotypes about the infertile and the ARTs might be mitigated over 
time. However, until this happens, infertility will remain a grave social 
onus for Iranian women—one that no amount of assisted reproduction 
or third-party donation can serve to overcome.
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NOTES
1. Gametes are eggs (ova) and sperm. Embryos are the fertilized product of 
eggs and sperm.
2. Fadlallah agrees with Khamenei’s permission of egg donation and, like 
Khamenei, does not condone the use of mut‘a marriages to solve the zina issue 
(Clarke 2006; 2008).
3. According to Islamic law, a child only inherits from his/her own biological 
parents. In sperm, gamete, and embryo donation, biological parenthood is not con-
sidered suffi  cient to establish a parental relationship or inheritance duties in Iran. 
In such circumstances, it is recommended that the receivers of the gametes make a 
legal commitment to take custody of the child and to specify in their wills that the 
child be given the same proportion of the assets as a natural child would inherit 
(Gheble’i-Kholi 2006). Th us, infertile parents are akin to adoptive parents.
4. Health and Treatment Centers are an integral part of a government health 
network system in Iran, developed to provide medical services and preventive 
measures to communities in less fortunate and remote areas of the country. Local 
health offi  cers are trained and supplied with basic material and support services, 
including for maternal and child health.
5. Women were identifi ed from fi ve HTCs, including Torab, Namjoo, Saheb 
Zaman, Dogma-Chee, and Leilato-l-ghadr.
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6. Health communicators are women with good social relations and repu-
tations in their communities who volunteer to receive special training about 
public health promotion and preventive measures. Th ey cooperate with local health 
centers to implement relevant health policies.
7. Maintaining absolute secrecy is oft en impossible, as shown in the work of 
Soraya Tremayne (2008). Secrecy depends on many factors, including education 
and social class. Families, and especially men’s families, are oft en deeply involved 
in the infertility problems of the couple and take an active role in their treatment. 
In addition, keeping treatment secret may only be possible if the couple lives far 
apart from the rest of the family or travels to other cities for treatment. Finally, 
when couples use relatives as donors, absolute secrecy is impossible.
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